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MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING: THE LIMITS OF 
LIABILITY FOR ITEM 303 OMISSIONS AND THE 
CIRCUIT SPLIT THAT NEVER WAS 
BRIAN CURRIE* 
ABSTRACT 
The implied private action for violations of SEC Rule 10b-5 has 
a contentious history. When plaintiffs base such actions on repre-
sentations of forward-looking information, however, the stakes are 
even higher. Recently, the federal circuit courts revisited this 
divisive issue while deciding whether an omission from required 
disclosure of Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) of 
financial conditions and results of operations. The apparent dispar-
ity between the federal circuit courts has caused great consterna-
tion and uncertainty in the corporate legal sphere. 
This Note will examine the origins and controversial history 
of Rule 10b-5 private actions, discuss the treatment of MD&A omis-
sions throughout the various federal circuits, offer a harmonized 
reading that resolves the perceived difference between the cir-
cuits, and explain how this reading satiates the concerns of both 
proponents and opponents of increased securities disclosure. 
 
When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, 
we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from 
little more than a legislative acorn.1 
—Justice William Rehnquist
                                                                                                            
*J.D. Candidate, 2017, William & Mary Law School; B.A., 2006, Purdue 
University. Many thanks to my wife, Becky, and daughters, Felicity and Ana-
stasia, for their unwavering support over the past three years. I am also 
indebted to the staff and editorial board of the William & Mary Business Law 
Review for their invaluable assistance in refining this Note for publication. 
1 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). Justice 
Rehnquist penned this oft-quoted phrase when a case confronted the Court 
with the prospect of extending Rule 10b-5 liability. Id. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Recently, a great commotion has erupted around the “judicial 
oak” of Rule 10b-5 private actions. At its center is the debate over 
whether to include omissions from Item 303 of Regulation S-K 
as a basis for satisfying the materiality prong of Rule 10b-5 lia-
bility.2 Within the last year, the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals both ruled on whether an omission on Item 3033 of Reg-
ulation S-K 4  could satisfy the materiality standard for Rule 
10b-55 civil actions.6 To the concern of many,7 the Second Cir-
cuit’s opinion announced that its decision was a clear split with 
the Ninth Circuit.8 
                                                                                                            
2 See generally Douglas Flaum, Kevin Broughel & Inna Coleman, Second Cir-
cuit Finds That Failure to Make Required Item 303 Disclosure Can Provide Basis 
for Securities Fraud Claim, PAUL HASTINGS: STAY CURRENT (Jan. 29, 2015), 
http://www.paulhastings.com/publications-items/details/?id=908de369-2334-64 
28-811c-ff00004cbded [https://perma.cc/XDJ3-WU5S] (anticipating a Supreme 
Court decision to settle the discrepancy); John Stigi & Madalyn Macarr, Second 
Circuit Notes Split with Ninth Circuit Over Whether Failure to Make Adequate 
Disclosures Under Item 303 of Regulation S-K May Serve as Basis for a Sec-
tion 10(b) Claim, SHEPPARDMULLIN: CORP. & SEC. L. BLOG (Jan. 26, 2015), http:// 
www.corporatesecuritieslawblog.com/2015/01/second-circuit-notes-split-with-ninth 
-circuit-over-whether-failure-to-make-adequate-disclosures-under-item-303-of 
-regulation-s-k-may-serve-as-basis-for-a-section-10b-claim [https://perma.cc/U5 
GN-2JVM] (noting a “clear” circuit court split that requires Supreme Court inter-
vention to resolve); Jonathan C. Dickey & Noah F. Stern, Creating a Clear Circuit 
Court Split, the Second Circuit Holds that Failure to Disclose Known Trends 
Or Uncertainties Under Item 303 of Regulation S-K Creates Liability Under 
Section 10(b), GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/pub 
lications/Documents/Second-Circuit--Failure-to-Disclose-Known-Trends-or-Un 
certainties-Under-Item-303--Regulation%20S-K-Creates-Liability.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/LQ2X-HD2S] (cautioning clients to carefully review their Item 303 
disclosures to prevent action from plaintiff’s attorneys); Michael Eisenkraft, 
Can Silence Keep You Safe? New Debate On 10b-5 Liability, LAW360 (Jan. 20, 
2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/612920/can-silence-keep-you-safe-new 
-debate-on-10b-5-liability [https://perma.cc/8S9D-CAEK] (predicting Supreme 
Court intervention to resolve the circuit court split). 
3 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2016). 
4 Id. § 229. 
5 Id. § 240.10b-5. 
6 See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2015); 
see also Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 768 F.3d 1046, 1054 (9th Cir. 2014). 
7 See, e.g., Dickey & Stern, supra note 2, at 1. 
8 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103–04. 
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Because over half of all securities litigation in the United 
States is adjudicated in these two jurisdictions,9 the immediate 
reaction from the legal sphere was—understandably—to alert 
corporate clients to the potentially disastrous consequences of 
failing to carefully analyze their Item 303 disclosures in light of 
the circuit split.10 Adding gravity to the debate, the Fifth Circuit 
District Court for the District of Minnesota, in a subsequent de-
cision, chose to follow the Second Circuit’s holding that Item 303 
omissions can form the basis of a Rule 10b-5 action.11 Despite all 
of the commotion, the Supreme Court chose not to address the 
issue when given the opportunity.12 
This Note explores the background and origins of the Ninth 
and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals’ opinions, identifies a way 
of reading the two opinions to resolve the superficial differences 
between them, and argues that such a harmonized reading of 
those decisions satisfies the major concerns of both proponents 
and opponents of private securities litigation. Part I gives context 
to the current debate over Item 303 by explaining the history 
and requirements of Item 303 and its role in the broader scheme 
of Regulation S-K and Rule 10b-5—the plaintiffs’ basis for relief 
in both Cohen and Stratte-McClure. Part II explores the specific 
factual and legal reasoning behind Oran13—the case upon which 
the split circuits both claim to base their reasoning—as well as 
how treatment of that case differed between Cohen, Stratte-
McClure, and Beaver County. Finally, Part III discusses how the 
inclusion of Item 303 as a possible basis for Rule 10b-5 viola-
tions will satisfy the concerns of both opponents and supporters 
of private Rule 10b-5 litigation. 
                                                                                                            
9 See FAIZAL KARIM & ANTHONY GALLO, COMING INTO FOCUS: 2014 SECURITIES 
LITIGATION STUDY 21 (Neil Keenan & Patricia Etzold eds., 2015), https:// 
www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2014-securities-litiga 
tion-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FTD-QZMS]. 
10 See generally Flaum et al., supra note 2; Dickey & Stern, supra note 2. 
11 Beaver Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 
1035, 1047 (D. Minn. 2015). 
12 Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 768 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 2349 (2015). 
13 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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I.  LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE STANDARDS FOR DISCLOSURE 
OF FORWARD-LOOKING “SOFT INFORMATION” 
A. The History of Forward-Looking Disclosures 
Because forward-looking projections are little more than edu-
cated estimates, securities specialists refer to it as “soft infor-
mation.”14 Prior to 1972, the Securities Act of 193315 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 193416 generally prohibited projec-
tion—that is, “forward-looking” filings.17 Although a full history 
of such disclosures is beyond the scope of this Note, a fundamental 
understanding of the reasoning behind such omissions is necessary. 
Generally, supporters of such an approach gave three ratio-
nales for the exclusion of these forward-looking projections.18 
First, supporters believed that the government’s duty was to 
protect unsophisticated investors from “their own ignorance” re-
garding whether soft information was reliable or not.19 Second, 
proponents believed (paradoxically, in light of the first rationale) 
that investors were capable of making their own predictions 
regarding a corporation’s future performance.20 The third and 
final justification was that forward-looking projections were not 
“facts” per se.21 
                                                                                                            
14 Using the term “soft information” to refer to a corporation’s future con-
dition or performance contrasts with the idea of “hard” information, which is 
known, unchangeable, historical data about a corporation’s past performance. 
SHARON L. FULLEN, HOW TO GET FINANCING FOR YOUR NEW SMALL BUSINESS: 
INNOVATIVE SOLUTIONS FROM THE EXPERTS WHO DO IT EVERY DAY 213 (2006) 
(defining “soft” information as opinions, guesses, and prediction in the con-
text of securities law); Joel Seligman, Colloquium: The SEC’s Unfinished Soft 
Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1953, 1953 (1995) (contrasting 
the nature of “soft information” and “hard information”). 
15 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012). 
16 Id. § 78a. 
17 LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURI-
TIES REGULATION 230 (6th ed. 2011). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. (quoting Report of the Advisory Comm. on Corp. Disclosure to the 
SEC, H.R. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 
348 (Comm. Print 1977)). 
20 LOSS ET AL., supra note 17, at 230. 
21 Id. 
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By the 1970s, however, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission’s (SEC) policy against allowing forward-looking disclo-
sures faced serious criticism.22 In the face of such criticism, the 
SEC ultimately capitulated and gave forward-looking statements a 
permanent home in SEC filings under Regulation S-K.23 The 
subsequent two decades saw an increasingly litigious atmo-
sphere and greater prominence of forward-looking statements.24 
Concurrently, the SEC slowly moved from “an emphasis on hard 
facts to ... [an] emphasis on ... predictive information.”25 
In 1989, the SEC adopted Item 303, the centerpiece of the 
current firestorm.26 Commentators have referred to Item 303 as 
“the most important textual disclosure item in Regulation S-K.”27 
Textually, Item 303 requires managers to disclose the corpora-
tion’s financial status, any changes in such financial condition, 
and anticipated results of operations.28 While Item 303 lists sev-
eral subcategories,29 perhaps the most onerous for management 
is the requirement of subsection (a)(3)(ii).30 Subsection (a)(3)(ii)—
regarding the “results of operations”—requires managers to per-
form the following: 
                                                                                                            
22 See JEREMY L. WIESEN, REGULATING TRANSACTIONS IN SECURITIES 311–19 
(1975) (offering a critique of the SEC’s disclosure requirements and their 
shortfalls, including references to ongoing efforts to include forward-looking 
statements in disclosures); see also Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, 
Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1197–98 (1970) 
(offering another scathing critique of many SEC policies and asserting that 
investors are most interested, inter alia, in earnings projections). 
23 See LOSS ET AL., supra note 17, at 231–35. 
24 Id. at 236. For a complete account of this remarkable turnaround in 
SEC disclosure policy, see generally Joel Seligman, Colloquium: The SEC’s 
Unfinished Soft Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1953 (1995). 
25 LOSS ET AL., supra note 17, at 265. 
26 MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 166 (6th ed. 2014); 
see also 43 SEC Docket 1330 (1989). 
27 LOSS ET AL., supra note 17, at 264. Item 303 has given rise to a fair 
amount of private litigation, and the liability for Item 303 omissions under 
the Securities Act of 1933 is well established. See generally Silverstrand Invs. 
v. AMAG Pharm., Inc., 707 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2013) (discussing liability under 
§ 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 for Item 303 omissions); J&R Mktg., SEP v. 
GMC, 549 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing liability under § 12 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 for Item 303 omissions). 
28 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (2011). 
29 Id. § (a)(1)–(5). 
30 Id. § (a)(3)(ii). 
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[D]escribe any known trends or uncertainties that have had 
or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material 
favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or 
income from continuing operations. If the registrant knows of 
events that will cause a material change in the relationship 
between costs and revenues ... the change in the relationship 
shall be disclosed.31 
Management must file Item 303 disclosures on an annual basis.32 
Furthermore, any “material” changes in operations or financial 
condition must be updated as required in the interim period.33 
The SEC provides instructions about weighing the materiality—
the threshold standard for disclosure requirements—of for-
ward-looking information in Item 303.34 The agency requires 
that management make two assessments in determining materi-
ality for the purposes of Item 303 disclosure.35 First, management 
must reasonably assess the likelihood of a known trend or un-
certainty coming to fruition.36 If the answer to this inquiry is 
“low,” then no disclosure is required.37 On the other hand, if no 
determination can be reasonably made, management must ob-
jectively assess the consequences if this trend or uncertainty 
occurs.38 Management must disclose this information unless it 
determines that the known trend or uncertainty is not reasona-
bly likely to have a material effect on the corporation’s financial 
condition or results of operations.39 
From their humble beginnings, forward-looking statements have 
seen a remarkable rise to becoming the centerpiece of securities 
litigation.40 Equally remarkable is that the failure to submit 
                                                                                                            
31 Id. 
32 Id. § (a). 
33 Id. § (b). 
34 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,429–30 (May 24, 1989). 
35 Id. at 22,430. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40  See Allan Horwich, Cleaning the Murky Safe Harbor for Forward-
Looking Statements: An Inquiry into Whether Actual Knowledge of Falsity 
Precludes the Meaningful Cautionary Statement Defense, 35 J. CORP. L. 519, 
520–21 (2010) (commenting on the growth of forward-looking statements from 
prohibited disclosure to “the most common basis for a private damage claim 
under the federal securities laws”). 
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forward-looking disclosures, a once prohibited practice, now triggers 
a whole host of serious SEC enforcement actions.41 Forward-
looking statements have become an increasingly dangerous source 
of liability and consternation for corporate firms and their legal 
counsel.42 In their current context, the importance of forward-
looking disclosures has combined with Item 303’s detailed 
standard for materiality to create the current discrepancy among 
the circuit courts of appeals.43 
B. Standard for Actionable Omissions Under Rule 10b-5 
In order to understand how the requirements of Item 303 
contrast and overlap with the materiality of Rule 10b-5 (and, 
thus, lay the foundation for understanding the current circuit 
court split), a basic understanding of Rule 10b-5’s history and 
judicial standards merit discussion. Rule 10b-5 was first pro-
mulgated in 1942 pursuant to authority granted under § 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.44 While originally designed 
                                                                                                            
41 Under the 1933 Act, misstatements or omissions on required forward-looking 
disclosures can lead to criminal or civil sanctions under sections 11, 12(a)(1), 
12(a)(2), or 17(a). See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 77l(a)(1), 77l(a)(2), 77(q) (2012). 
42 See generally Robert J. Mallonek & Paul A. Serritella, ‘Panther Part-
ners’ and Disclosure of Trends Under Item 303, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 11, 2012), 
LEXIS (discussing the broadening liability for Item 303 omissions and noting 
that interest in liability for forward-looking statements is growing); Matthew 
L. Mustokoff, Is Item 303 Liability under the Securities Act Becoming a 
“Trend”?, http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/securities/email 
/summer2012/summer2012-0912-is-item-303-liability-under-securities-act-be 
coming-trend.html [https://perma.cc/S5D4-J7KN] (discussing the increasing 
liability for Item 303 omissions under various provisions of the Securities Act 
of 1933). 
43 One line from the Federal Register—relied upon by the circuit courts in 
their decisions—nicely illustrates the underlying legal headache regarding 
the materiality of Item 303 omissions: “the ... test for materiality approved by 
the Supreme Court [for Rule 10b-5] ... is inapposite to Item 303 disclosure.” 
54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,430 n.27 (May 24, 1989). 
44 Justin Marocco, When Will It Finally End: The Effectiveness of the Rule 
10b-5 Private Action as a Fraud-Deterrence Mechanism Post-Janus, 73 LA. L. 
REV. 633, 633 (2013); see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, 
§ 10b, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)) (pro-
hibiting the use of “manipulative or deceptive device[s]” in connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security, and impliedly granting the SEC enforce-
ment power via “necessary or appropriate” rules and regulations); 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10b-5 (2015). 
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as a gap-filling measure,45 it took less than four years for this 
agency-empowering rule to spawn an implied private right of ac-
tion.46 Eventually the Supreme Court “established that a private 
right of action is implied under [Rule 10b-5].”47 
The elements of the implied private action under Rule 10b-5 
claims are (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; 
(3) a connection between the misrepresentation and the purchase or 
sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omis-
sion; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.48  As mentioned 
above, the current circuit court split revolves around the materi-
ality requirement—specifically the idea of a “material omission.” 
In its seminal decision, the Supreme Court held in Basic v. 
Levinson that an actionable statement (or omission) must be 
misleading, but that “[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not 
misleading under Rule 10b-5.”49  Regarding required forward-
looking disclosures, the Court formulated a specific test for the 
materiality of such statements: courts must “balanc[e] ... both 
the indicated probability that the event will occur and the antic-
ipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the com-
pany activity.”50 
C. Special Considerations for Private Securities Litigation Under 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
In 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (PSLRA)51 to protect defendants from frivolous class 
action suits under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.52 The 
                                                                                                            
45 HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLF, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 
§ 27:2 (2015 ed.). Considering the prominence of Rule 10b-5 in modern securi-
ties jurisprudence, it is interesting to note that an ad-hoc committee very 
hastily drafted the rule in less than a day. See Milton V. Freeman, Colloquium 
Foreword, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S1, S1–S2 (1993). 
46 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
47 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). 
48 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1317 (2011). 
49 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988). 
50 Id. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d 
Cir. 1968)). 
51 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 
737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2011)); see also BLOOMENTHAL & 
WOLF, supra note 45, § 1:15. 
52 BLOOMENTHAL & WOLF, supra note 45, § 1:15. 
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most obvious protection of the PSLRA, the “safe harbor” provi-
sions, would apply to the inclusion of Item 303 omissions.53 The 
“safe harbor” provisions of the PSLRA offer blanket protection 
for forward-looking “soft information” in three circumstances: 
 
(1) the statement is identified as forward-looking and is 
accompanied by sufficient cautionary statements; 
(2) the statement is immaterial; or 
(3) if the plaintiff is unable—with regards to a natural 
person defendant—to adequately show scienter or—with 
regards to a corporate defendant—to prove that the 
statement was made by (or with approval of) an execu-
tive officer.54 
 
While the impossibility of qualifying an omission as “forward-
looking” excludes the first possible “safe harbor,” the second and 
third provisions above apply directly to provision Item 303 omis-
sions.55 Notably, these “safe harbors” played a significant role in 
the litigation in both Cohen and Stratte-McClure.56 
II. TREATMENT OF ITEM 303 OMISSIONS IN RULE 10B-5 ACTIONS 
AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS 
A. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals—Oran v. Stafford 
In coming to their respective holdings regarding actionability 
of Item 303 omissions, the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts of 
Appeals (as well as the district court for the District of Minnesota) 
relied heavily on a Third Circuit Court of Appeals opinion authored 
by then-Judge Alito that pre-dated his Supreme Court tenure.57 
                                                                                                            
53 Id. § 28:6. 
54 Id. (emphasis added). 
55 See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103–04 (2d Cir. 
2015) (noting that an omission that satisfies the Item 303 materiality test would 
also need to pass a heightened standard of materiality); Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 
768 F.3d 1046, 1056 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that the Item 303 disclosures on 
which plaintiffs based their claim failed to satisfy the “materiality” requirement). 
56 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103–04; Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1056. 
57 See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103; Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1055–56; Bea-
ver Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 
1047–48 (D. Minn. 2015). 
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1. The Background to Oran v. Stafford 
Oran was an appeal of summary judgment against the plaintiff-
purchasers in favor of the defendant-corporation.58 The district 
court found that plaintiffs failed to plead any material mis-
statement or omission as required by Rule 10b-5.59 The plaintiffs 
contended that the defendants (American Home Products Cor-
poration and certain officers and directors) had violated Rule 
10b-5 by failing to disclose information regarding the potential 
negative side effects of the corporation’s pharmaceutical prod-
ucts.60 The district court61 dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaints 
for failing to state a material omission.62 On appeal, the plain-
tiffs contended that the district court erred in holding that a 
violation of Item 303 cannot satisfy the materiality prong of a 
Rule 10b-5 private securities claim.63 
2. The Holding in Oran 
In addressing the plaintiffs’ claims regarding Item 303, the 
Third Circuit first resolved the question of whether Item 303 
creates an independent private right of action.64 Although a pre-
vious appellate decision had left this question open,65 the Third 
Circuit spared little time rejecting this proposition—disposing of 
the idea in two sentences.66 
Plaintiffs further contended, in the alternative, that Item 303 
“imposes an affirmative duty of disclosure ... that, if violated, would 
constitute a material omission under Rule 10b-5.”67 In coming to 
its decision, the Third Circuit considered the disparity regarding 
the definition of “materiality” for the purpose of Item 303 as 
                                                                                                            
58 Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 281 (3d Cir. 2000). 
59 Id. at 288. 
60 See id. at 275–80. 
61 Oran v. Stafford, 34 F. Supp. 2d 906 (D.N.J. 1999). 
62 See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text (thoroughly discussing 
10b-5’s materiality requirement regarding omissions). 
63 Oran, 226 F.3d at 281. 
64 Id. at 287. 
65 Id. (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 
1418 n.7 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. (emphasis added). 
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compared with that for the purpose of establishing Rule 10b-5 
liability.68 The court noted “[the Item 303 disclosure] test varies 
considerably from the general test for securities fraud materiality set 
out by the Supreme Court in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.”69 Most damn-
ing, however, was the SEC’s own assessment of the different 
standards—stating that the Rule 10b-5 standard from Basic is 
“inapposite to Item 303 disclosure.”70 
In its ultimate conclusion on the matter, the Third Circuit 
held that, because Item 303’s materiality standards required 
more than Rule 10b-5, “a violation of [Item 303’s] reporting re-
quirements does not automatically give rise to a material omis-
sion under Rule 10b-5.”71 The court, however, also penned language 
requiring that plaintiffs “must ... separately show” a Rule 10b-5 
duty to disclose and that perhaps an Item 303 disclosure could 
support a Rule 10b-5 claim.72 
The Oran opinion suggests that the plaintiffs’ mistake was 
not in using an Item 303 omission as the basis for a Rule 10b-5 
action, but rather an insufficient pleading.73 The opinion notes 
that materiality under Item 303’s disclosure requirements does 
not inevitably lead to the conclusion that such disclosure is also 
material as required under Rule 10b-5.74 As noted above, the Third 
Circuit fell far short of claiming that an Item 303 omission can 
never form the basis of a Rule 10b-5 action.75 Rather, the appellate 
decision only suggests that an Item 303 omission must be prop-
erly pled as satisfying the heightened standard for Rule 10b-5 
omissions.76 This ruling, while apparently clear on its face, laid 
the foundation for the current controversy between the Second 
and Ninth Circuits’ readings of Oran. 
                                                                                                            
68 Id. at 287–88. 
69 Id. at 288. 
70 Id. (quoting 54 Fed. Reg. 22,430 n.27 (May 24, 1989)). 
71 Id. (emphasis added). This emphasized language will become important 
in reconciling the Second and Ninth Circuit opinions below. 
72 Id. (emphasis added). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 See supra notes 70–71, and accompanying text. 
76 Oran, 226 F.3d at 288. 
392 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:379 
 
B. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals—Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp. 
1. The Background to Cohen 
Cohen, similar to Oran, involved a class action securities liti-
gation against a corporate defendant.77 Plaintiffs claimed that 
NVIDIA Corp. (NVIDIA), a manufacturer of computer chips and 
semiconductors, had failed to disclose material information re-
garding potential problems with the solder used on its micro-
chips.78 When the problems with the solder became widely known, 
NVIDIA’s share price dropped by 31 percent.79 Consequently, 
plaintiff-investors filed suit under, inter alia, the theory that 
NVIDIA and its directors had violated Rule 10b-5 by omitting 
the known solder issues from its Item 303 disclosures.80 
2. The Cohen Court’s Reading of Oran and Ultimate Holding 
Cohen, like Oran, was an appeal of summary judgment against 
the plaintiff-purchasers in favor of the defendant-corporation for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.81 Spe-
cifically, the district court took issue with the plaintiffs’ inade-
quate pleading of both scienter and materiality in relation to their 
Rule 10b-5 claim.82 The plaintiffs contended that NVIDIA violated 
Rule 10b-5 by failing to disclose reports of serious defects in its 
computer chips.83 On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the 
district court erred in holding that violation of Item 303 could not 
satisfy the materiality prong of a Rule 10b-5 claim.84 Subsequently, 
the court—relying in part on its reading of Oran—held that Item 
303 does not create a duty to disclose for purposes of Rule 10b-5.85 
In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit began echoing 
the analysis laid out in Oran by comparing the materiality 
                                                                                                            
77 Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 768 F.3d 1046, 1048–51 (9th Cir. 2014). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 1050–51. 
80 Id. at 1051. 
81 Id. at 1048; Oran, 226 F.3d at 281. 
82 Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1048; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. 
L. 73-291, § 10b, 48 Stat. 881, 891 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77j(b) (2012)); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
83 See Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1048–51. 
84 Id. at 1048. 
85 Id. at 1056. 
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requirements of Item 303 and Rule 10b-5.86 The Cohen court 
went further than Oran’s analysis: it added that “[m]anagement’s 
duty to disclose under Item 303 is much broader than what is 
required under the standard [for Rule 10b-5].”87 Also similar to 
Oran, the Ninth Circuit noted that even the strongest cases sup-
porting the plaintiffs’ position were unavailing.88 
The language of the Ninth Circuit’s ultimate holding in Cohen 
closely mirrors that of Oran.89 The court held that “Item 303 does 
not create a duty to disclose for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.90 Such a duty to disclose must be separately shown according 
to the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Basic and 
Matrixx Initiatives.”91 This language seems to implicate that the 
plaintiffs’ Item 303 claim did not run afoul of some newly created 
blanket immunity from Rule 10b-5 liability for Item 303 omissions, 
but that the language failed to adequately plead such an omis-
sion satisfied the Rule 10b-5 standard (the “something more”).92 
C. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals—Stratte-McClure v. 
Morgan Stanley 
1. The Background of Stratte-McClure 
Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley also involved a class action 
lawsuit by plaintiff-investors against a corporate defendant.93 Here, 
                                                                                                            
86 Id. at 1055; accord. Oran, 226 F.3d at 288. 
87 Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1055. 
88 Plaintiffs relied upon a District of Rhode Island case from 1996, in which the 
court stated that Item 303 imposed an “affirmative duty to disclose.” Simon v. Am. 
Power Conversion Corp., 945 F. Supp. 416, 431 (D.R.I. 1996). However, that point 
was clarified in a later opinion by the same District Judge, noting that “plaintiffs 
may not rely solely upon Item 303 to prove materiality in violation of Rule 10b-5.” 
Kafenbaum v. GTECH Holdings Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d 238, 250 (D.R.I. 2002). 
89 Compare Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1056 (“[A] duty to disclose [on Item 303 for the 
purposes of establishing Rule 10b-5 liability] must be separately shown according 
to the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Basic and Matrixx Initiatives.”), 
with Oran, 226 F.3d at 288 (“A violation of [Item] 303’s reporting requirements 
does not automatically give rise to a material omission under Rule 10b-5. 
Because plaintiffs have failed to plead any actionable misrepresentation or 
omission under [Rule 10b-5], [Item] 303 cannot provide a basis for liability.”). 
90 Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1056. 
91 Id. (emphasis added). 
92 Id. at 1054–56. 
93 Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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the corporate defendant was investment firm Morgan Stanley.94 
Plaintiffs contended that Morgan Stanley failed to disclose its losses 
in the subprime mortgage market.95 Morgan Stanley’s extensive 
exposure in this area would eventually cost the firm billions of 
dollars as the subprime market began to collapse.96 As the market 
reacted to this news, the firm’s stock price fell by 29 percent.97 
Consequently, plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the firm had de-
ceptively omitted this information from its Item 303 filings.98 
2. The Stratte-McClure Court’s Reading of Oran and Cohen 
and Ultimate Holding 
Similar to the district court’s disposition in Cohen, the District 
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed plaintiffs’ 
suit for failure to state a claim.99 In analyzing the issue on ap-
peal, the court of appeals addressed—and offered a scathing rebuke 
of—the Cohen opinion’s treatment of Item 303 omissions in the 
context of Rule 10b-5100 actions.101 Specifically, the Stratte-McClure 
court took issue with Cohen’s reading of Oran v. Stafford.102 In 
its reasoning regarding the Item 303 liability issue, the Second 
Circuit relied on the similarities between Rule 10b-5 and other 
provisions of the securities laws.103 The Second Circuit noted 
that it had already held that an Item 303 omission could form 
                                                                                                            
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 97–98. 
96 Id. at 97. 
97 Brief and Special Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellant and Movant-Appellant 
at 20, Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 13-
0627-CV). 
98 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 96. 
99 Id. 
100 Within the Stratte-McClure opinion’s text, the court alternates between 
referencing Section 10(b) liability (the statutory text) and Rule 10b-5 liability 
(the regulatory liability). Id. at 96, 100–04, 106–08. Because Section 10(b) liability 
arises out of a violation of Rule 10b-5, see Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (prohibiting the use of any manipulative or decep-
tive device in violation of the SEC’s rules (including Rule 10b-5)), this Note 
simplifies the nomenclature by referring to Rule 10b-5 wherever possible. 
101 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103–04. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 101–02. 
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the basis for a claim under Sections 11 and 12(a)104 of the Secu-
rities Act of 1933.105 The Second Circuit further noted that its 
likely treatment of Item 303 omissions under Rule 10b-5 had 
been foreshadowed in several previous decisions.106 Bolstering 
its basis for analogizing to Section 12(a) liability, the Second 
Circuit noted that both Sections 12(a) and Rule 10b-5 require 
the disclosure of “material fact[s] necessary in order to make ... 
statements made ... not misleading.”107 
Having established its basis for including Item 303 disclo-
sures within the realm of possible bases for Rule 10b-5 liability, 
the court proceeded to qualify its holding.108 The court noted that 
the standards for Item 303 disclosure and the standards re-
quired by Rule 10b-5’s materiality test differed significantly.109 
Moreover, the court, similar to its Third and Ninth Circuit coun-
terparts, cautiously pointed out that the SEC itself noted that 
the material standards for Item 303 and Rule 10b-5 are “inappo-
site.”110 Ultimately, the Second Circuit laid down a simple test: 
Item 303 disclosures can only form a basis for Rule 10b-5 claims 
if they meet the higher materiality standard that already exists 
for omissions under that rule.111 
Despite a difference in the legal reasoning—and antagonistic 
language—the Second Circuit came to the same conclusion as 
the Ninth Circuit in Cohen.112 Although the court went to great 
lengths to establish that an Item 303 omission could satisfy the 
materiality standard under Rule 10b-5,113 the Second Circuit 
still upheld the district court’s dismissal.114 This result means 
                                                                                                            
104 See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-22, §§ 11, 48 Stat. 74, 82–83 (1933) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §77k (2012)) (regarding liability arising from 
registration statements); 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (regarding liability arising from 
prospectuses or oral communications). 
105 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 101–02. 
106 Id. at 102. 
107 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
108 Id. at 102–03. 
109 Id. The same language was used in both of the previously discussed 
opinions. See supra notes 68–71, 89–91 and accompanying text. 
110 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 102–03. 
113 Id. at 100, 107–08. 
114 Id. at 100, 108. 
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that two circuit courts with factually similar scenarios coming to 
the same outcome have created a circuit court split in the process. 
D. The District Court for the District of Minnesota—Beaver 
County Employees’ Retirement Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc. 
Although Beaver County Employees’ Retirement Fund v. Tile 
Shop Holdings, Inc. is not an appellate court decision, its facts 
and analysis are indicative of how subsequent district court de-
cisions will handle the issue of Item 303 omissions. 
1. The Background to Tile Shop 
In Tile Shop, the district court was asked to rule on defendant’s 
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claim that they had omitted 
material information from their Item 303 filing and, consequently, 
had violated Rule 10b-5.115 The defendant corporation (Tile Shop) 
and its officers had been involved in several questionable dealings 
as a provider of stone and tile products.116 The company failed to 
disclose its increasing reliance on certain trading partners.117 
Ultimately, an independent report detailed these relationships 
and noted that Tile Shop’s earnings had been overstated as a re-
sult of the favorable dealings between these trading partners.118 
Consequently, Tile Shop’s stock fell significantly.119 
2. The Tile Shop Court’s Reading of Oran, Cohen, and 
Stratte-McClure 
The District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the 
approaches, reasoning, and readings of Oran presented by both 
the Second and the Ninth Circuits.120 The court ultimately found 
the Second Circuit’s reasoning more persuasive.121 The Tile Shop 
                                                                                                            
115 Beaver Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 
3d 1035, 1044–48 (D. Minn. 2015). 
116 Id. at 1042–43. 
117 Id. at 1043–44. 
118 Id. at 1043. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 1047–48. 
121 Id. at 1047. 
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court believed that Stratte-McClure correctly read the standard 
outlined in Oran, and, accordingly, the Tile Shop court adopted 
the same standard for its own review.122 The district court’s 
opinion, however, differs importantly from the circuit court opin-
ions noted above. The court, unlike those appellate decisions, upheld 
the Rule 10b-5 claim premised on an Item 303 omission.123 That 
is, the court allowed the claim to survive the defendants’ mo-
tions to dismiss.124 
III. DISPELLING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT MYTH 
Upon a basic understanding of the background and reasoning 
among the circuit courts, it is easy to assume that a circuit court 
split exists. After all, the Second Circuit and the District Court 
for the District of Minnesota both outright acknowledge the 
split.125 Two important aspects of this circuit court divergence, 
however, cast light on the legitimacy of this “split.”126 First, it is 
not entirely clear that the Second Circuit’s opinion on the issue 
is binding legal precedent.127 Secondly, assuming, arguendo, that 
the pertinent language of the Stratte-McClure opinion was indeed 
a precedential holding, some doubt still remains about whether or 
not these holdings are wholly inconsistent and irreconcilable.128 
A. The Second Circuit’s Opinion on Item 303 Omissions May Be 
Non-Binding Dicta 
When this issue was filed with the Supreme Court in a petition 
for certiorari, the Cohen defendants’ brief asserted that the 
Stratte-McClure opinion’s discussion of Item 303’s duty to dis-
close is nothing more than dicta.129 A case usually is not treated 
                                                                                                            
122 Id. at 1047–48. 
123 Id. at 1060–61. 
124 Id. 
125 Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 103 (2d Cir. 2015); 
Tile Shop, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 1047. 
126 The Cohen defendants briefed each of these aspects in opposition to the 
petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Brief in Opposition at 12–17, 
Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015) (No. 14-975) [hereinafter 
Brief in Opposition]. 
127 Id. at 13. 
128 Id. at 13–15. 
129 Id. at 13. 
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as authority with regard to any point of law not necessary to 
decide the case or specifically raised before the court.130 This 
contention, upon a cursory glance of the Stratte-McClure opin-
ion, appears to be well founded. The plaintiffs’ action in Stratte-
McClure was, after all, dismissed on grounds of scienter, thus 
negating the need to discuss the materiality standard and the 
sufficiency of Item 303 omissions.131 The Cohen defendants’ Brief 
in Opposition also correctly notes that the Second Circuit itself 
has previously identified dicta as a statement that is “unneces-
sary to the decision in the case.”132 
Despite the arguments that the language in Stratte-McClure 
is largely dicta and non-binding, it is worth noting that there is 
equal authority to suggest that such a statement is binding on 
lower courts. The district courts within the Second Circuit have 
consistently held that pronouncements of the court of appeals 
that appear as dicta must be “regarded as the law of the Circuit, 
even though not ... a necessary step in the reasoning leading to a 
holding.”133 Moreover, a substantial line of cases already exists 
that tangentially allude to the possibility of Rule 10b-5 liability 
for Item 303 omissions within the Second Circuit.134 
Most fatal to the argument that the Second Circuit’s opinion 
lacks precedential value is the mere fact that the appellate court 
devoted so much time to directly address this specific point of 
law.135 Despite the plaintiffs’ failure to address the materiality 
                                                                                                            
130 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 130 (2016) (citing Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
of Neb., Inc. v. Dailey, 687 N.W.2d 689 (Neb. 2004)). 
131 Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2015). In 
fact, the court itself acknowledged that its discussion of Item 303 was unnec-
essary: “We assume, arguendo, that this [Item 303] omission was material 
under Basic. We nonetheless affirm the district court’s dismissal of the 
claim[.]” Id. 
132 Brief in Opposition, supra note 126, at 13. 
133 United States v. Oshatz, 912 F.2d 534, 540 (2d Cir. 1990); see also In re 
Calvary Const., Inc., 496 B.R. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Patsy’s Italian Rest., Inc. 
v. Banas, 508 F. Supp. 2d 194, 209 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
134 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 101 n.4; see also In re Scholastic Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 74 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that Item 303 omissions could 
contribute to an adequately pled violation of Rule 10b-5); In re Corning, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 349 F. Supp. 2d 698, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that a district court 
must give Item 303 consideration when evaluating claims under Rule 10b-5). 
135 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 100–04. 
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issue in their appellate brief,136 the Court of Appeals devoted 
nearly half of its discussion to commenting on the issue.137 Given 
the importance attached to court of appeal’s dicta in the Second 
Circuit and the amount of effort that the Stratte-McClure court 
spent reasoning and justifying its comments, it is unlikely that 
any district court within the Second Circuit would render a con-
trary ruling when faced with similar facts. 
B. The Opinions of the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts of 
Appeals Can Be Harmonized into a Single, Coherent Holding 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Stratte-McClure opinion’s ruling 
regarding Item 303 omissions is certain to persuade any district 
court faced with the same issue,138 a convincing argument can 
be made that there is no significant difference in the treatment 
of the issue under Stratte-McClure and Cohen. In sum, the Sec-
ond Circuit declared that its decision was contrary to the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion when, in reality, it was not.139 
As the Cohen defendants’ Brief in Opposition notes, a careful 
reading of both decisions reveals that the two opinions agree on 
several points.140 First, both courts agree that disclosure require-
ments are broader under Item 303 than under Basic’s require-
ment for Rule 10b-5.141 Second, the opinions agree that an Item 
303 omission does not automatically establish materiality under 
Basic’s Rule 10b-5 standard.142 Third, and most importantly, the 
                                                                                                            
136 Plaintiffs’ appeal fails to plead materiality according to the standards 
outlined in Basic and Matrixx Initiatives. See generally Brief and Special Ap-
pendix for Plaintiff-Appellant and Movant-Appellant, Stratte-McClure v. Morgan 
Stanley, No. 13-0627-CV (2d Cir. May 29, 2013). 
137 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 100–04. 
138 There can be little doubt that this would be the result of any subse-
quent Rule 10b-5 action premised on an Item 303 omission that satisfies the 
Court’s Basic standard for materiality. 
139 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103. 
140 Brief in Opposition, supra note 126, at 13–14. 
141 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103 (“Item 303’s disclosure obligations extend 
considerably beyond those required by Rule 10b-5.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000)); Cohen v. 
NVIDIA Corp., 768 F.3d 1046, 1055 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Management’s duty to dis-
close under Item 303 is much broader than what is required under ... Basic.”). 
142 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102, 103 (“The failure to make a required dis-
closure under Item 303 ... is not by itself sufficient to state a claim ... under [Rule 
10b-5].”); Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1055 (“[T]he ‘demonstration of a violation of the 
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opinions both conclude that a plaintiff must allege that the 
omission independently satisfies Basic’s heightened standard in 
order to sustain a Rule 10b-5 action.143 
Excluding the Second Circuit’s critique of the Cohen opinion, 
the two opinions display only subtle differences in their approach 
to the question. Moreover, the two opinions’ holdings are not con-
trary. Rather, they are complementary. A future district court could 
reasonably read the Ninth Circuit’s opinion as considering whether 
an omission that satisfies Item 303’s materiality standard imputes 
liability automatically under Rule 10b-5 without any further alle-
gations.144 The answer is, obviously, “no.”145 The same hypothetical 
district court could reasonably read the Second Circuit’s opinion 
as considering whether an omission that satisfies both Item 303 and 
Rule 10b-5 materiality standards can support a Rule 10b-5 ac-
tion.146 The answer is “yes.”147 The two answers are not mutually 
exclusive. Both courts agree that an Item 303 omission that satisfies 
the lower Item 303 materiality standard but fails the higher Rule 
10b-5 standard cannot carry the day on a motion to dismiss.148 
Finally, the Cohen opinion still leaves open the question of 
whether an Item 303 disclosure could potentially form the basis 
of a Rule 10b-5 action.149 Theoretically, a Ninth Circuit district 
court considering a motion to dismiss when an Item 303 omission 
                                                                                                            
disclosure requirements of Item 303 does not lead inevitably to the conclusion 
that such disclosure would be required under Rule 10b-5.’”) (quoting Oran v. 
Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 288 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
143 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103 (“[P]laintiff must first allege that the 
defendant failed to comply with Item 303 .... [P]laintiff must then allege that 
the omitted information was material under Basic’s ... test.”); Cohen, 768 
F.3d at 1056 (finding that plaintiffs could rely solely upon an Item 303 omis-
sion, but must also separately show materiality “according to the principles 
set forth by the Supreme Court in Basic.”). 
144 See Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1056. 
145 Id. 
146 See Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. (“[A] violation of Item 303’s disclosure requirements can only sus-
tain a claim under ... Rule 10b-5 if the allegedly omitted information satisfies 
Basic’s test for materiality.”); Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1056 (“[A] duty to disclose 
[under Rule 10b-5] must be separately shown according to the principles set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Basic[.]”). 
149 See Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1054–56 (failing to state that an Item 303 omis-
sion could not form the basis of a Rule 10b-5 disclosure; instead, merely stating 
that Item 303 by itself does not create a duty under Rule 10b-5). 
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has been properly plead to simultaneously satisfy both the Item 
303 materiality standard150 and the higher Rule 10b-5 standard 
as laid out in Basic151 would not be required to dismiss the case 
because of the Cohen precedent152—nor would the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals be bound to overrule such a dismissal on appeal. 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN FAVOR OF THE  
HARMONIZED READING 
A. The Harmonized Reading Increases Market Accuracy 
When traders are given more quality information regarding a 
certain stock, they are better able to effectively establish a secu-
rity’s actual value.153 Traders do this out of a belief that current 
stock prices are inherently incorrect—that is, they cannot reflect all 
available information.154 While the ultimate motive for any investi-
gation is almost certainly personal profit,155 the tangential benefits 
that accrue to the market from accurate pricing are important.156 
It is generally believed that markets and society in general 
are better off when stock prices more accurately reflect their 
true value.157 More specifically, the more accurately a security’s 
price reflects its true value, the more efficient society’s allocation 
of resources becomes.158 It has been argued that increasingly 
accurate stock prices allow investors to more effectively iden-
tify and select those corporations with superior prospects. 159 
                                                                                                            
150 That is, the “trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty” is likely to 
come to fruition, or a determination cannot be made and will likely have a 
material effect on the corporation’s financial condition or results of operations. 
Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of 
Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 
22,430 (May 24, 1989). 
151 That is, the forward-looking statement is material after balancing the 
likelihood that it will come to fruition and the anticipated magnitude of its 
impact. See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988). 
152 Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1054–55. 
153 Kevin Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Compa-
nies’ Stock Prices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121, 132 (2015). 
154 Id. at 131–32. 
155 Id. at 132–33. 
156 Id. at 133–34. 
157 Id. at 123–24. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 137. 
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Conversely, increasingly inaccurate markets lead to a poorer 
allocation of resources.160 In this sense, market accuracy cuts as 
a double-edged sword, simultaneously allocating resources to 
high-potential corporations while diverting them away from low-
potential corporations.161 
The harmonized reading would incentivize firms to take a 
more cautious approach to their Item 303 filings—favoring 
over-inclusive disclosure of potentially material information. 
These increased disclosures would allow markets to maintain a 
high level of accuracy162 and, thus, prevent the ignorant, ineffi-
cient allocation of resources to firms with serious flaws. As an 
illustration, in Oran, Cohen, Stratte-McClure, and Tile Shop, 
each of the four plaintiffs argued that the respective defendant- 
corporations’ stock did not accurately reflect the risks associated 
with its purchase.163 If investors had had access to information 
regarding the various faults of these firms through a complete 
Item 303 disclosure, then their knowledge would have likely 
affected the price of the respective corporations’ stocks. Armed 
with an accurate price and increased knowledge, the market 
would have reacted by reallocating resources away from subop-
timal firms and into those which carried less risk. 
B. PSLRA Protections Prevent Meritless Strike-Suits Under the 
Harmonized Reading 
While proponents of disclosure often tout the “market accuracy” 
argument,164 many scholars who oppose this view argue with 
                                                                                                            
160 Id. at 137–38. 
161 Id. at 137. 
162 See id. at 126, 182. 
163 In Oran, the stock price allegedly was an inaccurate reflection of the 
risk associated with the pharmaceutical’s side effects. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 
F.3d 275, 283 (3d Cir. 2000). In Cohen, the stock price did not accurately reflect the 
risk associated with the faulty solder. See Cohen v. NVIDIA Corp., 768 F.3d 1046, 
1048, 1050–51 (9th Cir. 2014). In Stratte-McClure the stock price did not accu-
rately reflect the risk associated with an extensive exposure to the credit-default 
market. See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 98, 104 (2d Cir. 
2015). In Tile Shop, the stock price did not accurately reflect the truth behind the 
source of the corporation’s profit margins. See Beaver Cty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund 
v. Tile Shop Holdings, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1050–52 (D. Minn. 2015). 
164 See generally Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Gov-
ernance, LAW & CONTEMP. LEGAL PROBS., Summer 1999, at 113 (noting the 
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equal voracity; they argue that securities laws have gone too far and 
have caused an enormous amount of baseless strike suits to the 
benefit of plaintiffs’ attorneys alone.165 Many look no further 
than the skyrocketing cost of defending class action securities fraud 
lawsuits.166 From this viewpoint, Item 303 omissions may seem to 
be a frightening new arrow in the class action plaintiff’s quiver. 
To give corporations some additional protection from the on-
slaught of private class action lawsuits under Rule 10b-5, Congress 
enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) in 
1996.167 The PSLRA—in conjunction with the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure168—raises the standard for a private securities 
action to survive a motion to dismiss.169 Per these requirements, 
plaintiffs who wish to premise a Rule 10b-5 action on a material 
omission—such as an Item 303 omission under the harmonized 
reading of Cohen and Stratte-McClure—must plead “with par-
ticularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defend-
ant acted with the required state of mind.”170 The most important 
wrinkle to this heightened requirement is that a plaintiff must 
overcome this hurdle before proceeding with discovery.171 A plain-
tiff, therefore, without access to discovery tools such as depositions 
or document production, must state particularized facts regard-
ing board room discussions or decisions about SEC filings (e.g., 
Item 303)—a difficult task.172 
Under the harmonized reading, however, the materiality 
prong of the PSLRA’s “safe harbor” provisions still applies to 
                                                                                                            
benefits of increased accuracy that result directly from increased disclosure 
in the context of share price and the market for corporate control). 
165  See generally ANDREW J. PINCUS, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL 
REFORM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS: THE COST 
TO INVESTORS OF TODAY’S PRIVATE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION SYSTEM FAR 
OUTWEIGHS ANY BENEFITS (2014), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/up 
loads/sites/1/Securities_Class_Actions_Final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/BUA9-5TET]. 
166 Id. at 6 (noting that legal fees for such suits can run into the hundreds 
of millions of dollars). 
167 BLOOMENTHAL & WOLF, supra note 45, § 27:11. 
168 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Nine requires plaintiffs to plead the 
circumstances surrounding allegations of fraud with “particularity.” Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 9(b). 
169 See BLOOMENTHAL &WOLF, supra note 45, § 29:1–2. 
170 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2012). 
171 BLOOMENTHAL & WOLF, supra note 45, § 29:1. 
172 See id. 
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defendants facing allegations of violating Rule 10b-5 for Item 
303 omissions. As discussed above, Item 303 omissions would still 
need to satisfy the Basic standard of materiality.173 In fact, in 
Stratte-McClure and Cohen, the plaintiffs’ claims failed because 
they did not adequately plead scienter.174 Under the harmonized 
reading, Item 303 omissions would become “fair game,” and yet, 
the same set of rules, including all the difficulties in pleading 
scienter relating to forward-looking statements, would apply. 
CONCLUSION 
The “judicial oak” of Rule 10b-5 private actions has had a 
turbulent and interesting history. When the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals announced a split with its sister court in the Ninth 
Circuit, a reaction was expected and natural. In this case, the 
split may have been more mole hill than mountain. 
Upon a closer look, the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit 
based their decisions upon similar readings of the same cases. 
Moreover, the Second Circuit’s basis for its claim that their 
Stratte-McClure comments are “at odds with” the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Cohen is unclear.175 The Second Circuit’s criticism of 
Cohen and analysis of Oran were apparently persuasive enough 
to convince the District Court in Minnesota to agree with the 
court and (supposedly) disagree with the Ninth Circuit.176 
No matter how persuasive the Second Circuit’s reasoning, how-
ever, it is clear that harmonizing the holdings in Stratte-McClure 
and Cohen into a single coherent legal principle does not stretch 
the limits of logical possibility.177 The Second, Third, and Ninth 
Circuits agree that the standards for Item 303’s disclosure re-
quirement and a claim of securities fraud under the Rule 10b-5 
                                                                                                            
173 See supra Part III.B. 
174 Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776 F.3d 94, 104 (2d Cir. 2015) 
(assuming that the omission was material, yet failing to find scienter pled 
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175 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 103. 
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177 See supra Part IV. 
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differ significantly.178  The courts also agree that information 
that is required on Item 303 requires something more to give 
rise to Rule 10b-5 liability.179 It seems that this is merely the 
story of a circuit court split that simply never existed—but cre-
ated quite a stir nonetheless. 
                                                                                                            
178 Stratte-McClure, 776 F.3d at 102–03; Cohen, 768 F.3d at 1055; Oran v. 
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